COMMUNITY MONITORING
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Monitoring the Waste Control Disaster
- Bellevue Chemical Fire, Western Australia
- Bellevue Chemical Fire, Western Australia
BELLEVUE ACTION GROUP AND
THE ALLIANCE FOR A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT
MONITORING THE WASTE CONTROL DISASTER - BELLEVUE CHEMICAL FIRE, WESTERN AUSTRALIA
10 October, 2003
PROJECT AT A GLANCE
Problem:
The Waste Control site for hazardous chemicals had at no time fully complied with its licence requirements. Community groups and local residents were concerned about the potential for impacts from the extensive stockpiles of unidentified waste.
Objective:
To ascertain what was being stored onsite at Waste Control and in what conditions; and if necessary, force the closure of the Waste Control facility; and to ensure environmentally sound management for hazardous waste storage, transport and destruction in WA.
Monitoring Type:
Monitoring the types of chemicals and hazardous waste entering the site and recording the conditions in which they were stored.
Community Involvement:
The Bellevue Action Group, the Alliance for a Clean Environment and local residents.
Notable Features:
On the evening of February 15th 2001, the Waste Control facility monitored by the residents throughout 1999 in an attempt to ascertain what was being stored onsite and in what conditions, erupted into flames. Within minutes massive explosions rocked the area and in one of Australia's largest chemical fires, huge white fireballs erupted from the facility and 205 litre drums flew hundreds of metres into the air, landing on neighboring properties and the highway, smothering the residents in thick acrid black smoke.
"There can be no doubt that the Waste Control site at no time fully complied with its license requirements and rarely, if ever, operated profitably. The situation that developed at Waste Control is evidence of the failure of waste management operators and governments to clearly understand the economic, social and environmental values and risks associated with the industry."
Tony Mcrae, MLA. Chairperson. Bellevue Hazardous Waste Fire Inquiry. June 2002 (1)
Background
In the Perth suburb of Bellevue, Western Australian, in a small cul de sac of mixed residential/ light industrial buildings, the Waste Control Pty Ltd Company occupied a converted weatherboard house on a 0.25ha site where they carried out the business of 'solvent recycling'. A hundred metres to the southwest lay a dampland to which the streets drained and which discharged to the Helena River. Forty years ago this section of Bellevue had been entirely residential but with industry encroachment, many residents had moved on and now numerous small automotive yards, industrial sheds and converted weatherboard houses were used for a variety of trades and commercial purposes. Still, some residential homes remained and with the high commercial occupancy rate, the area was generally busy during working hours.
The Waste Control Company had operated on this site in various forms since 1989 and had been known to the Department of Health (DOH) and the Department of Environment Protection (DEP) since its inception. Indeed, both government agencies recommended the facility to industry as a means of disposing of their hazardous waste.(2) The DOH held carriage of matters involving waste management in Western Australia until 1994(3) and was partially responsible for regulating activities at the site until that time. From 1994 onwards, the DEP handled waste regulation while the Department of Minerals and Energy licensed dangerous goods storage for flammables and explosives. All three agencies had direct roles in the oversight and regulation of the facility for the 13 years it was in operation. Waste Control employed between 2 and 7 staff (4) to process a variety of hazardous wastes, yet only two staff members were technically trained in chemicals management. Few Bellevue residents knew that the facility existed and even less were aware of the nature of the operation.
The front of the site appeared innocent enough with a weatherboard house as an office and a small hut adjacent used as a laboratory. Behind these structures the scene was far more alarming. Up to three thousand 205 litre drums of chlorinated and halogenated solvents, thinners, acids, oils and unknown wastes were stacked four high and dozens deep. Banks of industrial nickel-cadmium batteries were stacked among the drums. Heavy metal compounds including numerous glass Winchester bottles of mercury were piled around the yard. A pot distillery unit operating with superheated oil from an 'oil burner'(5) was at the center of the open storage yard and was used to separate contaminants from used solvents. The treated solvents were then resold to local users. The sludge waste from the distilling unit(6) was stored in drums on-site. Waste Control Pty Ltd had no capacity to treat heavy metals and many other wastes that made their way to the site. Underground storage tanks also held thousands of litres of liquid solvent waste.(7) In all, it is estimated that between 500,000 and 1 million litres of hazardous waste were stored on the site.(8)
Spills of hazardous liquids were a common occurrence at the site. Drums leaked and workers were often forced to operate in atrocious conditions. One worker collapsed from fumes only to be told by more senior staff that 'you'll get used to it', whereupon he was carried to the front yard for fresh air (9). At other times workers were forced to trudge around in inches of spilt perchloroethylene waste and were asked to mix unknown chemicals and acids, with perilous results. Eye injuries were occurring weekly before the introduction of monogoggles (10) On a number of occasions in the late 1990's hazardous liquids overflowed from onsite sumps, spilling out of the site and down the road. Local residents and businesses started complaining about the chemical odours and spills but no action was taken by any of the government departments. A particularly bad spill in 1999 (11) led to a $100,000 loan to the company from the West Australian Government to clear out the backlog of 1000 drums and send them to a disposal site in the eastern states. The loan was never recovered. Within months the space that had been created by removing 1000 drums was again filled with new drums of waste and the situation at the site became even more precarious.
Reactive chemicals were piled high upon each other and workers feared a fire or explosion at any moment. By January 2001 most workers had quit the site leaving only the manager, his assistant and a truck driver.(12)
At around 10.45pm on February 15, 2001, residents of Bellevue were awoken by a series of massive explosions that shook windows and lit up the night sky. Few people had any idea of the source of the explosions or the danger that beset them. Before sunrise, television viewers in the east of Australia, the US, and even Germany (13) had more information on the Waste Control chemical fire than most Bellevue residents. Professional firefighters racing to the scene, understood they were to attend a 'factory fire' and were ill equipped for the environment they were about to enter.. Volunteer firefighters with virtually no personal protective equipment were also called into action to attend 'scrub fires' at the same location.
For reasons that remain officially unknown, the Waste Control facility had erupted into flames and within minutes massive explosions rocked the area. Infrared footage taken by DEP officers on the way to the scene shows huge white fireballs erupting from the facility and 205 litre drums flying hundreds of metres into the air, and landing on neighboring properties and the highway. An enormous black plume of smoke could be seen by the light of explosions as it drifted west towards the center of the capital city, Perth. Later, air modelling demonstrated that the majority of the toxic particulate in the smoke cloud had deposited in the Swan River near the center of the city. (14)
A Community Inventory
At 7am, members of the Bellevue Action Group and Alliance for a Clean Environment were telephoned and urgently requested to attend the scene to provide Senior Firefighting officers with information about the chemicals stored on site. No inventory had been provided to the FESA at the outset and it was some weeks before government agencies released an inventory publicly. A full inventory of chemicals stored and handled at the site was a condition of the DEP and DME license and required by FESA yet no government agency was able to deliver any form of inventory on the night of the fire nor in the following days.
Firefighters mistakenly struggled to contain the blaze with water and failed. Eventually the chemicals were left to burn out of their own accord. Foam was not used as firefighters had been told it was a 'factory' fire not a 'chemical' fire. Millions of litres of firefighting water washed a cocktail of chemicals and heavy metals from the site onto adjacent properties and down road drains. The contaminated water exited the drains in the damplands near the Helena River and behind the Bellevue Primary School within metres of the nearest classroom. The fire was finally contained around 3am Friday morning but erupted again later that morning as drums continued to explode while emergency personnel attempted to access the burnt out site. By midday the fire was contained but continued to smolder and reignite for the duration of that week.
Monitoring the Impacts
A heavy stench of chemical fumes hung over the suburb for days as government agencies struggled to come to grips with the extent of the contamination. Health Authorities admitted that the evacuation on the night of the fire was a failure (15) and that unprotected firefighters had been engulfed by the toxic smoke and vapors as they fought nearby scrub fires started by falling drums. Some were admitted to hospital (16) and later developed severe health problems. Of 110 emergency personnel who attended the fire, 15 reported unusually high levels of chemicals in their systems when tested.(17) Many local residents stayed on their properties to battle encroaching and nearby scrub fires without any protective gear and with the fulln knowledge of FESA.
Still, the residents in close proximity to the fire were given no information for the first five days and official reports to the media claimed only thinners and white spirit had burned in the fire. In the following days and weeks after the fire, local residents were sent numerous government newsletters about the disaster with analytical tables showing, surprisingly, no contamination.
The first newsletter on the 20th February stated that if residents "smell odours from the site", they should:
- advise the DEP;
- close all windows and doors; and
- turn off airconditioners.
If the odour persists and they experienced discomfort, "it may be worth leaving you premises until the wind direction has changed."
A school bus depot was situated only 50 metres from the fire and was blanketed in toxic residue and condensate. Yet, later that Friday morning, seven hundred local school children were picked up in buses dripping with 'yellow' residues of the fire. The buses were pulled off the road within hours and then allowed to continue after receiving the 'OK' from the Health Department toxicologist. (18) Many children complained they felt ill after traveling in the buses. Tests conducted on the buses later in the week (19) found elevated levels of organic contaminants as well as lead, mercury and numerous other hazardous compounds. The DOH toxicology section advised the DEP that, on the basis of their risk assessment;
"Analytical results from these samples indicated levels of heavy metals which may pose a risk to children should they lick the surfaces daily for a week". (20)
The Bellevue Primary School 500m from the Waste Control site was not evacuated on the Friday morning on the advice of the Government's Principle Toxicologist despite spot fires continuing throughout the day.
Environmental Sampling
Environmental sampling commenced within a week of the fire and detected heavy metals, phthalates, phenols and chlorinated solvents at high levels on-site and in the drains where the contaminated firewater had flowed. (21) Dioxin was also detected up to 200m from the site. Subsequent groundwater analysis revealed high levels of chlorinated solvents (22) in groundwater moving beneath the Waste Control site. More recently, groundwater monitoring (23) has demonstrated that contamination (including high mercury levels) (24) has moved through the dampland and now sits only a few metres from the banks of the Helena River. No remediation plan has yet been devised for the site or to prevent the spread of contamination in groundwater.
Community Call for Inquiry
Community activists lobbied hard for an inquiry and called for a health surveillance program for residents or other personnel who were affected by fumes or other impacts from the fire. On the 21st May 2001, over three months after the fire, the Parliamentary inquiry finally began. It focused on the 'fact' that residents were fortunate that mercury was not burned in the fire, despite elevated levels of mercury being detected around (25) and beneath (26) the site as well as in the ambient air. (27) Similarly, the inquiry refused to acknowledge the presence of PCB's on-site. This was despite them being detected in follow up Greenpeace soil sampling, transformers being photographed on site (28)by residents and company invoices showing that hundreds of litres of oil containing PCB's had passed through the site. Importantly, many of the Inquiry's risk judgments were based on the 'fact' that mercury and PCB' were not present!
Community Environmental Health Surveys
Community activists carried environmental health surveys in the first three weeks after the fire and then again in six to eight months to follow up on initial findings. The DOH conducted a telephone population health survey (September 2001). Only 3 out of 37 residents living close to the site were contacted by the DOH in the telephone survey. All results were consistent and concluded that those residents living closest to the plant suffered the greatest impacts. In 2003, the DOH established a health register which currently (October 2003) has 180 people registered. In addition the FESA established their own register which currently (October 2003) has 360 firefighters registered. Three years after the fire, no action has been taken by government agencies to assist those affected by the fire with their ongoing health costs.
A community consultative committee was finally established 18 months after the fire. Yet, key questions remain unanswered;
Why did the planning regime permit such a hazardous facility to be sited in a residential area? Why was Waste Control's license not revoked when it was apparent they were incapable of safely running the operation? Why was air monitoring not conducted for weeks following the fire? Why were no attempts made by health officials to contact Bellevue residents in the aftermath of the fire? Why did government officials claim there was 'no risk' on the basis of risk assessment despite obvious and serious contamination?
Endnotes:
1 Mcrae, T., Economics and Industry Standing Committee -Bellevue Hazardous Waste Fire Inquiry. Legislative Assembly, Parliament of Western Australia. Volume Two. Report No.2. June 2002. Executive summary p. xii.
2 Brown. R., Submission to Economics and Industry Standing Committee -Bellevue Hazardous Waste Fire Inquiry, 27 July 2001, Legislative Assembly, Parliament of Western Australia. p. 7
3 Economics and Industry Standing Committee -Bellevue Hazardous Waste Fire Inquiry. Legislative Assembly, Parliament of Western Australia. Volume Two. Report No.2. June 2002. p.8
4 Interview with former Waste Control yard workers (23rd February 2001 Perth)
5 The exact nature of this apparatus has never been determined and it was destroyed in the fire. However a 1995 audit by a corporate waste supplier identified 'alcohols' as the fuel for the burner. [also Brown op cit n 28 at 3]
6 Commonly referred to in the waste industry as 'pot stills'.
7 Perchloroethylene, a chlorinated solvent used in dry cleaning processes was most common with thousands of liters stored above and below ground. While not flammable, 'perc' as it is commonly known, decomposes to deadly phosgene gas when incinerated.
8 government officials estimate 500, 000 litres were on site whilst former workers estimate that up 1 million litres were stored.
9 Interview with former Waste Control yard workers (23rd February 2001 Perth) Workers indicated this was not an uncommon occurrence.
10 Brown loc cit n36
11 Economics and Industry Standing Committee op cit n 29 p 16
12 Interview with former Waste Control yard workers (23rd February 2001 Perth) A heated altercation between yard-workers and management over the handling of an aluminium flask marked 'strontium' led to the walkout by workers.
13 Footage of the fire was so spectacular that it was being syndicated through television networks in other countries before most Western Australians had awoke the next morning. Surveys of Bellevue residents later found that many locals slept through the fire authorities even had a clear idea of the severity of the issue. Local environmental group, The Alliance for a Clean Environment, received calls from associates in the US and Germany indicating that they were viewing footage of the fire before it had even been extinguished.
14 Tromp, F., Department of Environmental Protection, Update on Waste Control clean up and tests. (circular to residents)p.23
15 Bremmer,J., Notes of meeting between Alliance for a Clean Environment representatives and Director of Environmental Health Section, DOH, Dr Michael Jackson . Grace Vaughan House, Perth, May 30th 2001
16 Jones, G., Transcript of Evidence Taken at Perth- First Session Friday 31st August 2001. Economics and Industry Standing Committee -Bellevue Hazardous Waste Fire Inquiry. Legislative Assembly, Parliament of Western Australia. p.19
17 ibid
18 (Interview with the Midland Bus Company manager) March 15, 2001. Perth.
19 Stass Environmental, Waste Control Fire Clean-up Operations: Environmental Sampling and Methods, Bellevue, WA. May 2001. Appendix B
20 McLeod, P., Department of Environmental Protection, DEP Media Backgrounder. 28 February 2001, p.3
21 Stass Environmental op cit Chapter 8
22 URS Australia, Detailed Site Investigation- Final Report, Waste Control Site, Bellevue, Western Australia. ref: 20857-040-562/548-F4580.1p.ES-2
23 Department of Environmental Protection, Waste Control Groundwater Monitoring Results. June 2002. p. 3
24 Department of Environmental Protection, Waste Control Groundwater Monitoring Results. August 2002. p.1
25 Stass Environmental op cit p20
26 Department of Environmental Protection loc cit
27 Department of Environmental Protection. High Volume Dust Sample Analysis for Bellevue Primary School (circular to Bellevue residents), 6th April 2001 p.12
28 Authors personal collection. May 2000
IPEN Body Burden Community Monitoring Handbook - 2003
Ver. Draft 2.
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